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Vendor Opportunism in IT Outsourcing: 
A TCE and Social Capital Perspective 
 
Abstract: Academic researchers have attributed significant attention to the drivers of 
opportunistic behavior, yet our understanding of how opportunistic behavior can be mitigated 
remains relatively fragmented. Our investigation will focus on the social context and more 
specifically on the role of social capital in the deterrence of opportunistic behavior. Based on 
two qualitative case studies in the financial sector, we will illustrate how the structural, 
cognitive, and relational dimensions of social capital can reduce internal and behavioral 
uncertainty between the outsourcing partners, thereby facilitating the mitigation of 
opportunistic behavior. In our study we combine the theory of transaction costs with social 
capital theory and demonstrate how they can usefully complement each other to enhance our 
understanding of mechanisms that can deter opportunistic behavior. 
 
Keywords: Vendor opportunism, Transaction costs, Social capital, IT outsourcing, Case 
study 
 
INTRODUCTION 
IT outsourcing has emerged as an important tool for enabling organizations around the world 
to enhance their competitiveness by gaining access to the distinctive expertise and 
technological competencies of external suppliers. The result of this trend is a significant 
upsurge in the outsourcing of information technology. The combined global market revenues 
for IT and business process outsourcing for 2010 were estimated to exceed $US 237 billion 
and were set to rise 8-12% per annum between 2011 and 2014 (Willcocks et al., 2011).  
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While the growth of outsourcing has been impressive, there is still a lot to be learnt 
with regards to the management of external service provision. A significant amount of 
research has been devoted to outsourcing decisions and in particular the type of activities to 
be outsourced (Dibbern et al., 2008; Møller-Larsen et al., 2012; Stringfellow et al., 2008). 
While this stream of studies has yielded significant insights for the effectiveness of 
outsourcing strategies, an important amount of research is increasingly concerned with the on-
going governance of outsourcing arrangements (i.e. Mani et al., 2012; Goo et al., 2009; Gopal 
& Koka, 2012; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008) .  
Both commercial and academic publications have recognized outsourcing governance 
as a key mechanism for the achievement of desirable outsourcing outcomes, but also for the 
mitigation of outsourcing risks related to the engagement of opportunistic behavior 
(Equaterra, 2010; Lacity et al., 2010; Mercer, 2010). Opportunistic behavior in particular has 
been widely acknowledged as a central concern with outsourcing activities (McIvor, 2008).  
Academic researchers have attributed significant attention to the drivers of 
opportunistic behavior (Lumineau & Quelin, 2011). From a transaction costs economics 
(TCE) perspective, a number of studies indicated asset specificity (and in particular 
investments that are relationship specific) and uncertainty as the primary drivers of 
opportunistic behavior (Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Goo et al., 2009; Barthelemy & Quelin, 
2006; Ang & Cummings, 1997). While this stream of research has generated significant 
insights, the very own phenomenon of opportunism, particularly with regards to its behavioral 
dimensions, has not be adequately addressed (Lacity et al., 2011; Rindfleisch et al., 2010; 
Macher & Richman, 2008; Wathne & Heide, 2000).  Moreover, a number of TCE studies 
have taken into account certain facets of uncertainty while ignoring others (Tiwana & Bush, 
2007; Aubert et al., 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002)  or neglecting the role of uncertainty all 
together (Lumineau & Quelin, 2011; De Vita et al., 2010 Jap & Anderson, 2003; Grober & 
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Cheon, et al.), focusing solely on the construct of asset specificity. More generally, research 
on TCE has been criticized for neglecting the social context of transactions (Zazac & Olsen, 
1993; Granovetter, 1985).  
These are the departure points for our study. Our investigation will focus on the social 
context, and, more specifically, on the role of social capital in the deterrence of opportunistic 
behavior. Up to now, social capital theory has not been applied to the study of opportunistic 
behavior in business transactions, but we will demonstrate that it is a useful complement to 
TCE in addressing this issue. Based on two qualitative case studies in the financial sector, we 
will illustrate how the structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions of social capital can 
reduce uncertainty between the outsourcing partners, thereby facilitating the mitigation of 
opportunistic behavior. In this manner, weaddress the need for an examination of the 
behavioral dimensions of opportunism, the role of uncertainty in driving opportunistic 
behavior, and the social context of outsourcing transactions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Vendor opportunism and IT outsourcing 
A central premise of the theory of transaction cost economics is the assumption of 
opportunism. In particular, this assumption holds that decision makers, given the opportunity, 
are acting out of self-interest. Williamson (1985:47) defined opportunism as: ‘a lack of 
honesty or candor in transaction, to include self-interest seeking with guile…More generally, 
opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse’. Opportunistic 
behavior of vendors in IT outsourcing arrangements may take many forms, for example 
failing to fulfill promises and obligations, withholding or distorting information regarding the 
venture or reducing quality in the delivery of products or services.  
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The intense focus of TCE on the malicious side of human nature, where individuals 
“will not reliably self-enforce promises but will defect from the letter and spirit of an 
agreement when it suits their purposes” (Williamson, 1985), has led a large stream of research 
to excessively criticize the theory. In particular, there have been strong judgments that such 
Machiavelian view on human nature can generate insights that are “dangerous” (Perrow, 
1986) and “bad for practice” (Ghosal and Moran, 1996).  
Evidently, Williamson did not maintain that all individuals are going to behave 
opportunistically in all circumstances. On the contrary, he suggested individuals to be 
“engaged in business as usual, with little or no thought to opportunism, most of the time” 
(Williamson, 1993). He further clarified that “although it is unnecessary to assume that all 
human agents are identically opportunistic, much less continuously opportunistic, it is truly 
utopian to presume unfailing stewardship” (Williamson, 1998). He therefore maintained that a 
thorough examination of the hazards of opportunism is essential for the mitigation of these 
hazards (Williamson, 1998).  
Based on a transaction costs economic perspective therefore, a significant amount of 
research has been concerned with contractual attributes and safeguards that can limit the 
potential for opportunistic behavior and ensure that the terms of transactions will be 
enforceable. In this vein of research, it was suggested that a significant level of detail and 
accuracy is needed at the contractual level so that the possibility for the engagement of 
opportunistic behavior by the vendor becomes mitigated (Parkhe, 1993; Saunders, et al., 
1997; Aubert et al., 2004). Furthermore, contracts must be constructed in such a way so that 
the client avoids over-dependence on the vendor (Lacity & Willcocks, 2009).  
From a relational perspective, another stream of research suggested that relational 
governance mechanisms can be also used for the mitigation of opportunistic behavior by the 
vendor. This stream of research suggested that while an organization may have the potential 
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to behave opportunistically against its partner, it may not do so. Mechanisms regulating a 
partner’s behavior include trust (Lee et al., 2008; Barthelemy, 2003; Sahay et al., 2003; Uzzi, 
1996) commitment (Mohr & Spekman, 1994), communication (Kern & Willcocks, 2002; 
Sahay et al., 2003; Tompkins et al., 2006) and power-control (Klein, 2000; Lacity & 
Willcocks, 2009). By acknowledging that such relational mechanisms can mitigate 
opportunistic behavior, this research modifies TCE theory’s original tenet that transaction 
partners will behave opportunistically if they have the opportunity to do so (Williamson, 
1985).  
In our study, we are going to take a new perspective on the behavioral aspects of 
vendor opportunism in IT outsourcing. In particular, we are going to examine how social 
capital mechanisms, in the form of the cognitive, structural and relational dimension of social 
capital reduce uncertainty around the transaction and therefore mitigate opportunistic 
behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that aims to complement the 
theory of transaction costs with the theory of social capital in the study of opportunistic 
behavior.  
 
Transaction cost economics theory   
The theory of transaction cost economics has been widely used in the study of sourcing 
decisions. A number of TCE studies have focused on the role of asset specificity in 
transaction costs and the respective ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision. The rationale for doing this has 
been the recognition of ‘asset specificity’ by Williamson (1985) as the most important 
dimension that explains costs of the transaction, more so than the TCE elements of 
‘uncertainty’ and transaction ‘frequency’. More specifically, Williamson (1981: 1546) has 
suggested that ‘a considerable amount of explanatory power turns on the asset specificity 
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variable, with neither uncertainty nor frequency –alone or in combination- leading to 
hierarchical governance’.  
While asset specificity is a key determinant of transaction costs, since it is directly 
related to the object of the exchange, we argue that an analysis that downplays the role of the 
uncertainty or transaction frequency is going to be unnecessarily limited.  Our paper singles 
out the uncertainty component and examines how it depends on social capital, whilst 
transaction frequency and its relation to social capital is beyond the scope of our study. This 
choice was driven by our data, namely our respondent’s primary emphasis on the uncertainty 
component.   
The theory of transaction costs has been highly criticized for not paying enough 
attention to the social embeddedness of transactions (Ghosal & Moran, 1996; Granovetter, 
1985; Uzzi, 1996; Zazac & Olsen, 1993). In particular, this stream of research has critiqued 
the prevalence of economic performance as a driver of exchange behavior, which is a basic 
tenet of TCE (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Researchers have tried to combine TCE with other 
organizational theories in order to address this limitation. As examples, Artz and Brush 
(2000) combined the theories of transaction costs and relational exchange and found that 
relational norms decrease transaction costs. Similarly, Nyaga et al. (2010) combined the 
theories of transaction costs and relational exchange to study the economic and relational 
factors that drive satisfaction and performance. Bahli and Rivard (2013) following Ouchi 
(1980) integrated the concept of ‘clan mechanisms’ of governance into Williamson’s TCE 
framework.  
We argue that focusing on ‘uncertainty factors’ can illuminate significant social 
factors surrounding the transaction and affecting the outsourcing outcome. Accordingly, we 
expect that the theory of social capital can usefully complement the theory of transaction costs 
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and illustrate how mechanisms of social capital can mitigate uncertainty and therefore 
opportunistic behavior between the outsourcing partners.   
In our analysis we will distinguish between different types of uncertainty that impact 
transaction costs. Uncertainty is generated by phenomena that are hard to anticipate and, 
consequently, hard to specify in the contract. As Klein (1989:256) suggested ‘It appears that 
uncertainty is too broad a concept and that different facets of it lead to both a desire for 
flexibility and a motivation to reduce transaction costs’.  
Taking into account the broadness of uncertainty as a concept, we observe that a 
number of TCE studies have operationalized uncertainty in a relatively constrained manner, 
taking into account certain facets of uncertainty while ignoring others or neglecting the role of 
uncertainty all together (De Vita et al.,et al., 2010; Thouin, et al.,et al., 2009; Gooroochurn & 
Hanley, 2007). Williamson (1985) himself did not give a very detailed definition of 
uncertainty. Based on the work of Koopmans (1957), he identified three classes of 
uncertainty. The primary class of uncertainty is ‘state contingent’. The secondary class arises 
‘from lack of communication, that is from one decision maker having no way of finding out 
the concurrent decisions and plans made by others’. The third class of uncertainty, 
Williamson called ‘behavioral uncertainty’. On behavioral uncertainty he noted that ‘the 
secondary uncertainty … is of a rather innocent or non-strategic kind. There is a lack of 
timely communication, but no reference is made to strategic non-disclosure, disguise, or 
distortion of information. Such strategic features are unavoidably present, however, when 
parties are joined in a condition of bilateral dependency. A third class of uncertainty- namely, 
behavioral (or binary) uncertainty- is thus usefully recognized’ (Williamson, 1985).  
Since Williamson’s conceptualization of uncertainty has not been regarded as 
particularly concrete to operationalize, further work on transaction costs has distinguished 
between environmental, internal and behavioral types of uncertainty. In this frame, 
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environmental uncertainty corresponds to Williamson’s conceptualization of primary 
uncertainty; internal uncertainty resembles to Williamson’s conceptualization of secondary 
uncertainty; and behavioral uncertainty constitutes Williamson’s third type of uncertainty. In 
our analysis therefore, we will take an integrated perspective and examine all three types of 
uncertainty. 
In particular, regarding environmental uncertainty (commonly defined as the difficulty 
to foresee changes in the external environment because of exogenous forces), we will initially 
adopt the categorization made by Walker and Weber (1984). The authors extended the basic 
TCE framework developed by Williamson and identified two types of environmental 
uncertainty: volume and technological. Volume uncertainty refers to the inability of 
predicting the necessary demand from a certain type of a product or service due to exogenous 
factors. Technological uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to an inability to foresee and 
follow technological changes. Furthermore, in our analysis we will include the availability of 
alternative suppliers as a source of environmental uncertainty (Cannon & Perrault, 1999) as 
well as regulatory pressures (Miranda & Kim, 2006).  
As far as internal uncertainty is concerned, we will initially focus on the ability of a 
firm to clarify its requirements regarding what is the exact kind of service or product it needs. 
Furthermore, following Aubert et al. (2004), we will examine the level of professionalization 
in the IT department.  We also follow Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and Lacity et al. 
(2011) and take into account measurement difficulties in the assessment of uncertainty. We 
classify these issues as types of internal uncertainty. 
As far as behavioral uncertainty is concerned, this is related to difficulties in 
predicting the actions of the exchange party, in the light of the potential for opportunistic 
behavior. A number of TCE studies (for example Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Geyskens et al., 
2006) relate behavioral uncertainty to the difficulty of measuring the performance of the 
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vendor. Geyskens et al. (2006:521) very specifically mention that ‘the effect of behavioral 
uncertainty is a performance evaluation problem- that is, difficulty in ascertaining ex post 
whether contractual compliance has taken place’. However, coining behavioral uncertainty to 
difficulties in measurement departs from the core of TCE logic (Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 
2011), and we therefore focus our assessment of behavioral uncertainty on possibilities for 
opportunistic behavior that the supplier may engage in. 
 
Social capital 
Social capital can be understood as ‘the goodwill that is engendered by the fabric of social 
relations and that can be mobilized to facilitate action’ (Adler & Kwon, 2002: 17). 
Researchers have focused on social relations of individuals as well as groups, and on their 
internal social ties (with members of their own social group), or external social ties (with 
other groups, their members, or individuals outside the group). These social ties generate 
resources, which is captured in Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) prominent definition of social 
capital as the ‘resources embedded within, available through, and derived from an 
individual’s or social unit’s network of relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 243). We 
use Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s definition to investigate the resources that a vendor and a client 
firm gain from their relationship within an outsourcing arrangement. More specifically, we 
will argue that the social ties between vendor and client create resources that enable these 
partners to decrease uncertainty and thereby reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior.  
Social capital can yield several benefits. Many empirical studies have demonstrated 
the relation of social capital with performance, either of individuals, groups, projects, or 
organizations (see Payne et al., 2011: 499). Adler and Kwon (2002) focus on more specific 
benefits and classify information, influence, control and power, and solidarity as the most 
important ones. To illustrate, social ties provide easier access to information and facilitate 
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knowledge sharing (e.g. Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Van den Hoof et al., 2004; Reagans & Evily, 
2003). They are also a source of power, for example through obligations from other actors 
within the network (Coleman, 1988) or relationships with influential actors in the network. 
Moreover, strong social norms and beliefs lead to solidarity within a social network, because 
they encourage compliance with a group’s rules (Adler and Kwon; 2002: 29). This reduces 
the need for formal controls (Adler and Kwon; 2002: 29). We will argue that such solidarity 
will reduce the uncertainty of other network members’ behavior, and will thereby mitigate the 
risk of opportunistic behavior.  
The concept of social capital has been applied to a wide range of social settings, but, 
to our knowledge, not to the study of opportunistic behavior during business transactions. As 
mentioned above, research on relational governance has highlighted the importance on certain 
relationship aspects such as trust, commitment, and communication for mitigating the risk of 
opportunistic behavior, but has not examined them through the (more comprehensive) social 
capital lens. Moreover, a few researchers use the social capital lens within the IT outsourcing 
context, however without examining  opportunistic behavior. These papers demonstrate the 
importance of social capital between outsourcing partners for their knowledge transfer ability 
and motivation (Rottman, 2008; Zimmermann and Ravishankar, 2014).  
Several other researchers examine the function of certain relationship aspects, which 
are part of social capital, within outsourcing relationships (see Zimmermann, 2011: 68, for a 
review), but again without attention to opportunistic behavior. More specifically, there is 
evidence that on-site visits, frequent communication, and a shared understanding of tasks are 
fundamental to knowledge transfer and success in IT outsourcing collaborations (e.g. Dibbern 
et al., 2008; Subsingha et al., 2012). In the same vein, effective formal and informal 
communication between outsourcing partners (Herbsleb & Mockus, 2003; Cataldo & 
Herbsleb, 2008) as well as trust (Lee et al., 2008; Westner & Strahringer, 2010) are well 
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known preconditions of IT outsourcing success. On a more general level, it has been observed 
that strong relationships are particularly hard to achieve, but at the same time particularly 
important in virtual collaborations, which includes outsourcing partnerships (Cummings, 
2011; Zahedia et al., 2010, Zimmermann, 2011). 
 Social capital theory provides a distinction between different dimensions of social 
capital, which helps us to identify how specific aspects of relationships function to reduce 
certain types of uncertainty in the transactions between client and vendor firm, and thereby 
help to mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) differentiate 
between the structural, cognitive, and relational dimension of social capital.   
The structural dimension refers to the overall pattern and configuration of connections 
between actors - i.e. ‘who you reach and how you reach them’ (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 
244). This includes the presence or absence of ties, their strength, as well as their patterns, 
reflected in the shape of communication and interaction between actors. We assume that the 
structural dimension cannot directly affect the levels of uncertainty in a partnership, but is 
likely to affect it indirectly, by shaping the relational and dimensions, which we describe later 
on.  
The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to the resources within relationships 
that provide shared representations, interpretations and systems of meanings (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998, p. 244). These can be part of a shared vision and culture (e.g. Inkpen & Tsang, 
2005), which again act as a bonding mechanism and shared frame of reference. The cognitive 
dimension of social capital is likely to be associated with internal uncertainty, because the 
absence of a shared frame of reference will make it hard for partner firms to achieve a shared 
understanding of requirements for products or services. By contrast, the cognitive dimension 
of social capital does not have any apparent direct effect on environmental or behavioral 
uncertainty. 
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The relational dimension of social capital refers to assets created and leveraged 
through personal relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Important facets of the relational 
dimension include trust and trustworthiness, norms and sanctions, obligations and 
expectations, and identity and identification (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Amongst these, 
trust is likely to be particularly important in counteracting behavioral uncertainty during a 
business transaction. Newell and Swan (2000: 1293) note that trust ‘is about dealing with 
uncertainty and risk’, thus stating the link between the relational dimension of social capital 
and uncertainty in an explicit manner. It is easier for network members to anticipate each 
other’s behavior if they trust that other network members will keep their promises and will 
not pursue hidden agendas.  Research on virtual collaborations has also highlighted that trust 
is particularly important for overcoming the uncertainties about remote colleagues’ intentions 
and behavior, which are intensified by spatial, organizational, and cultural boundaries (Hsu et 
al., 2007; Zimmermann, 2011: 66). In the context of offshore outsourcing relationships, Kelly 
and Noonan (2008) emphasize that trust in offshore partners’ ability, benevolence, and 
integrity reduce onshore partners’ anxieties and increased their psychological security. We do, 
by contrast, not see any obvious links between trust and external or internal uncertainty. 
With regard to the other parts of the relational dimension, we note that shared norms, 
and behavioral norms in particular, will make it easier for partners to anticipate each other’s 
behavior, thus reducing behavioral uncertainty. Expectations and obligations, in turn, can 
counteract both internal uncertainty (in terms of clarity of required service) and behavioral 
uncertainty, if the transaction partners’ expectations  and perceptions of obligations are 
congruent. Furthermore, ‘identification’ is the condition where values or standards of the 
individual merge with those of a group, and this creates collective goals and aspirations. It is 
apparent again that this may create greater certainty about the behavior of the other 
transaction partner. Hence, with regard to the relational dimension of social capital, the effects 
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on behavioral uncertainty are particularly apparent, even though they have not been 
investigated as such. 
It should be emphasized that the three dimensions of social capital are interrelated. 
Shared identity, as part of the relational dimension, tends to go hand in hand with the shared 
representations and meanings that are part of the cognitive dimension of social capital 
(Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998: 251. This implies that shared identity has an indirect effect on 
internal uncertainty, through its connection with shared representations. Shared representions, 
in turn, is likely to have an indirect association with behavioral uncertainty, through their link 
with shared identity. The structural dimension, in turn, underscores both the cognitive and the 
relational dimension of social capital. When interactions in a social network are more frequent 
and ties are closer, members of the network will have a chance to develop a better shared 
understanding and shared vision (cognitive dimension), and they will be able to develop 
stronger trust and shared identity (relational dimension). Even though the structural dimension 
is not likely to affect uncertainty in a direct manner, it will therefore affect internal and 
behavioral uncertainty indirectly, by determining the other two dimensions of social capital.  
Following on from our considerations on opportunistic behavior, uncertainty and 
social capital, we explore the following research question:  
What roles do the cognitive, relational and structural dimensions of social capital play in the 
reduction of environmental, internal, and behavioral uncertainty, and therefore the mitigation 
of opportunistic behavior in an outsourcing context?  We will now outline our research 
methods before presenting and discussing the findings of our inquiry. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our research question calls for a qualitative case study research method. We examine the role 
of social capital in the reduction of uncertainty, which incorporates the questions of how and 
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why social capital plays a role in this matter. A particular strength of qualitative case studies 
lies in their use for exploring such how and why questions, because they enable us to gain an 
understanding of the nature and complexity of the processes taking place (Benbasat et al., 
1987). Our case study method thus yielded an in-depth explanation of how and why the 
different dimensions of social capital were connected with certain types of uncertainty. 
Qualitative case studies are further suitable for revealing complex social phenomena in 
relation to their real life context (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 2009), allowing us to provide a 
rich description of social capital dimensions and uncertainty in certain company contexts. 
Our study combines strong deductive and inductive elements (see Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Kirsch, 2004). On the one hand, our inquiry is guided by the extant theories of TCE and social 
capital, and by our theoretical considerations of how social capital may affect uncertainty and 
therefore the mitigation of opportunistic behavior in an outsourcing context. On the other 
hand, the study is to significant extents exploratory, because the functioning of social capital 
in uncertainty reduction has not been described or hypothesized before. Qualitative methods 
are particularly useful for exploring such under-researched matters, because they enable us to 
surface and understand unknown phenomena, and to demonstrate in depth how processes 
such as social capital and uncertainty are related to each other.  
Our investigation was focused on the financial services industry. This sector is now 
widely perceived as the biggest consumer of IT outsourcing (Computer Weekly, 2013; 
Rawlinson, 2011) and we therefore regarded the selection of case studies within the financial 
services industry very typical in outsourcing. With regards to the outsourcing relationships 
under investigation, we examined arrangements that were of significance to the organization 
(i.e. a relationship with an important vendor) and had developed over some time. In such 
relationships, we would expect to be better able to investigate social capital and its impact. In 
particular, the first contract we examined was between a major Dutch organization in the 
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financial-insurance sector (here named LION) and its supplier, an American organization that 
had a branch in the Netherlands (here named FDL). The contract included the development, 
support and maintenance of software applications. A large part of the outsourced work was 
performed in India. We conducted interviews with 12 participants during the period of 
January 2010, resulting in 11 sessions, as two of the participants were interviewed at the same 
time. Table 1 provides an overview of the research participants from LION and FDL. 
 
- Insert Table 1 about here – 
 
The second contract we investigated was between a global investment bank (here 
named GIB) and its Indian supplier (here named PV). The contract included the support and 
maintenance of applications that were of relatively low strategic importance to the bank. The 
project was named ‘X-RAY‘. We carried out interviews with 14 participants during the period 
of October 2009 to April 2010. Three interviewees were identified as key informants and 
interviewed multiple times (see Table 2), resulting in overall 25 interview sessions. The 
following table provides an overview of the research participants from GIB and PV.  
 
- Insert Table 2 about here – 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and our questions were open-ended (please see the 
appendix for our guiding list of questions). In most of the interviews only one researcher (the 
first author of this paper) was present, however during the interviews with the more senior 
management, another researcher (an expert in the field of outsourcing) joined in the interview. 
We further conducted follow-up interviews (face to face) where we felt we needed further 
clarifications in order to draw our conclusions. 
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We used multiple data collection methods in order to provide a stronger substantiation 
of our theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989) and in addition to the interviews we viewed 
the outsourcing contracts under investigation, as well as documents on the outsourcing 
practices that the client and supplier organizations have been following. Having the chance to 
view these documents enabled us to gain more profound insights into internal uncertainty, 
particularly in terms of contract monitoring and level of professionalization within the IT 
departments. The evidence gained from these documents complemented the interview 
insights.  
 We chose to speak to managers who were involved in the outsourcing contracts under 
investigation, including operational managers, senior managers and directors who were 
knowledgeable about the relationship between their organization and the outsourcing partner. 
We included different management levels to gain a richer insight into the project under 
investigation and the development of the social capital between the two organizations. We 
tried to improve the validity of our findings by gathering insights both from the suppliers’ and 
the client side. All interviews lasted for approximately one hour. The interviews were 
transcribed, coded and analyzed using Atlas software.  
Our data analysis followed an iterative process of comparison between emergent 
findings with pre-existing concepts (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Kirsch, 2004). Due to our prior 
knowledge of TCE and social capital theory, our interviews gave us the initial idea of 
exploring the role of social capital in reducing uncertainty and opportunistic behavior. Our 
subsequent data analysis then allowed us to identify particular elements of uncertainty and 
social capital in the context of the case studies, and to describe specific links between these 
elements as presented by our respondents. When comparing these links with the relevant 
concepts in the TCE and social capital literatures, we established that the links were also 
plausible form a theoretical point of view. Accordingly, the coding of our data followed a 
 18 
 
procedure of template analysis (King, 2004) which was guided by the theories of TCE and 
social capital. In particular, we distinguished between the environmental, internal and 
behavioral types of uncertainty, as suggested by TCE, and we further distinguished between 
the cognitive, structural and relational dimensions of social capital. Based on our respondents’ 
reports, we created codes for several elements of each different type of uncertainty and each 
dimension of social capital, which corresponded to elements described in the TCE and social 
capital literature. However, our respondents did not mention all elements of uncertainty and 
social capital that have been described in the literature. The main codes (13 overall) and 
illustrative quotes are provided in the appendix. Using these codes, we analyzed our data and 
followed a largely inductive approach to establish the links between our primary constructs.  
The data was coded by the first author, and the results of the coding process were 
critically considered by both authors. To ensure a rigorous and valid interpretation of the data, 
we conducted many iterations when analyzing our evidence. Our intention was to ‘understand 
the whole’ by constantly revising it in ‘view of the reinterpretation of the parts’ (Myers, 
1994). On this basis, we re-visited our interview transcripts and other documents several 
times during our analysis.  
 
THE LION - FDL CASE STUDY 
LION is a global financial institution offering a variety of products and services ranging from 
banking and insurance to asset management. It employs about 115,000 people and serves 
private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. In 2006, the savings and 
loans division of LION Netherlands initiated a major outsourcing agreement. The agreement 
was signed with FDL, an organization that LION had already been co-operating with. FDL is 
a leading outsourcing provider specializing in the financial services industry. The company 
has a global presence and serves more than 60 countries. The contract was on application 
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development, support and maintenance. The cost model appeared to be very efficient, as 70% 
of the labor was offshored to India, namely in Bangalore and Chennai and 30% was based in 
Amsterdam. The offshored service was delivered by an Indian supplier which was an FDL 
company.  
In their co-operation, the two organizations went through a ‘get-to-know’ period, 
where they faced various challenges that will be illustrated further on. Their venture had 
overall progressed in a satisfactory manner for both sides. LION seemed to have chosen the 
right supplier for the services it was seeking to outsource.  
 
Uncertainty around the LION contract 
Environmental uncertainty 
LION was facing significant challenges in defining the volume of services it needed on the 
savings and loans systems development, support and maintenance. A major reason is that 
financial markets are highly unpredictable and that the demand for certain products and 
services changes rapidly. This volatility in the market environment is a significant driver for 
outsourcing within the financial services industry, particularly in information technology 
related products and business processes. As RP3 (LION Business manager) indicated: ‘In an 
organization like ours, if you only develop for your own organization you need people to do 
that of course and you have them on your payroll. And there is times when they do not have 
anything to do and there is times when they have too much to do. There is never a smooth line 
in the work. An outsourcing vendor has more flexibility in putting the right people, at the right 
time, in the right company’.  
Nevertheless, the financial industry went through a period of recession during 2008 
and a lot of institutions in the sector, including LION, incurred significant losses. The 
financial stretch that LION had been going through as a result of the economic crisis in 2008 
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made it compulsory for the firm to cut into its cost structure and reduce investments on 
systems development. Back then, LION negotiated with FDL to change their outsourcing cost 
model. The two organizations had a transparent discussion on the salary and compensation 
rates of the onshore and offshore workforce and decided that the most efficient way to go 
forward would be the reduction of the number of Indian employees. It appears however, that 
LION was still under pressure to reduce the volume of services outsourced to FDL on the 
savings and loans area. The disadvantage for LION was that reducing the size of the contract 
was most likely going to increase the pricing.  
Research participants did not appear to be particularly concerned with issues of 
technological uncertainty in the area of the savings and loans products. The research 
participants within LION were, however, concerned about the future of the venture with FDL. 
FDL is an American company and LION is its major customer in the Netherlands. The 
problem was that the volumes LION needed from FDL in the Netherlands were declining as a 
result of the financial crisis. For this reason, some of the research participants within LION 
explained their fear that FDL might decide at some point to ‘pull the plug’ in the Netherlands. 
LION was therefore also looking at other suppliers. It appears however that a major challenge 
for LION was to identify a technically competent supplier that would also have experience 
with the Dutch regulatory environment.  
Internal uncertainty 
Within the LION organization there were a lot of issues stemming from requirements 
uncertainty that increased the transaction costs with FDL. According to the research 
participants, LION had a difficulty in translating its business requirements into systems 
requirements, but also in identifying the exact scope of projects. ‘’Furthermore, LION was 
very often changing its requirements, which inhibited the effective co-ordination of processes 
with the offshore team. RP2 (LION lawyer) explained: ‘After the assessment of services you 
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are supposed to have an idea of the scope… but this is never the case within LION, because 
scope can change until you have signed the contract and after… So one of the big issues with 
any contract is that you need fixed requirements. If you know that they are hard to fix, like the 
LION case, you need a very firm change process and you have to stick to that’. While these 
issues were important and were causing disturbances in the execution of operations, it appears 
that the two organizations put the right processes in place in order to handle ‘requests for 
change’ relatively smoothly.  
Furthermore, it appears that within LION, the level of professionalization within the 
IT department was not particularly strong. According to our interviewees, the communication 
lines between different disciplines of the organization did not operate effectively. The size of 
LION made it additionally challenging to organize the flow of information which made the 
execution of work harder.  
In relation to the assessment of the performance of the vendor, it appears that LION 
was not facing any issues. The assessment of the service levels and the overall methodology 
against which the supplier’s performance would be assessed was clearly established by the 
contract between the two organizations. LION and FDL seemed to have very explicit 
governance processes set up and according to the research participants, there were not any 
penalties or too many issues of serious escalations.   
Behavioral uncertainty 
LION and FDL had a long history of co-operation before signing the outsourcing 
arrangement. For this reason, LION had a good idea of FDL’s capabilities and its way of 
conducting business, making FDL a reliable supplier. The prior history between the two firms 
provided LION with significant indications regarding the predictability of the vendor’s 
behavior. FDL had convinced LION in relation to its trustworthiness, its skill set and its 
ability to perform. On this basis, the prior history between the two firms created high 
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behavioral certainty, which mitigated the possibility that the FDL would behave 
opportunistically.  
Furthermore, it appears that FDL valued LION as a customer very highly. LION is 
one of the top institutions in the financial sector and thus it added to its suppliers’ reputation, 
including FDL. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that FDL would want to keep LION 
satisfied as a client.  
 
Social capital  
Structural dimension 
Middle and senior management of LION visited the FDL site in India frequently and vice 
versa. At the working level, employees communicated via e-mail, phone, and teleconference, 
often on a daily basis. Employees from the supplier’s side flew to the Netherlands quite often 
in order to discuss and address issues with the LION employees. The structural dimension of 
social capital between the partners was thus characterized by close and frequent interactions. 
At the same time, a boundary spanner (RP9, contract manager from FDL) seemed to 
play a key bridging role in the communication and alignment of understanding between the 
two parties. Having significant knowledge within the business of LION (regarding processes, 
requirements, priorities, objectives) he often played the role of the liaison between the two 
organizations.  
Over time, the two outsourcing partners strengthened their ties through increased 
interaction and communication. In particular, the two parties maintained high levels of 
continuous communication in order to clarify the objectives of their arrangement, explain the 
expectations and obligations of each party and ensure effective service delivery. Through this, 
the structural dimension of social capital, in terms of pattern of connections, helped to shape 
the cognitive and relational dimensions of social capital. 
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Cognitive dimension 
With respect to cognitive social capital, there were initially some issues related to the 
partners’ shared representations of their work practices and objectives. While LION and FDL 
had a supplier-client relationship before signing their outsourcing arrangement, there was still 
a period during which the two organizations were getting familiarized with each other’s 
operations, processes and objectives. RP3 (LION Business manager) illustrated: ‘At the 
beginning you start off by looking at each other, searching for ways to work together, 
challenging each other, questioning why the supplier cannot be cheaper or cannot work faster 
and so on…. I have been in a few meetings between LION and FDL back then which were 
tough meetings, because we did not know how the other person or the other company worked 
and we had different expectations…’.  Furthermore, as mentioned before, the role of the 
boundary spanner (RP9, contract manager from FDL) had been critical in the alignment of 
business between the two parties. For example RP8 (LION Service manager) explicitly 
mentioned that RP9’s ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ enabled him to generate dependable 
views and take appropriate actions: ‘RP9 came from LION and thus he knows very well our 
business and processes. He is also very good in giving announcements for new projects and 
rough estimations. He is able to do this because he knows our processes and he knows what is 
possible in the FDL architecture… So in a case of escalation when we call RP9, he 
understands the priority of it and he will try to do everything he can to deal with it…’. 
Language barriers were also reported as a major challenge for arriving at shared 
mental representations and interpretation of requirements. For example, RP11 (Consultant 
from FDL) noted that understanding the LION requirements was in some instances 
particularly difficult: ‘The thing is that Dutch people, while they are nice and helpful, they 
have a tendency to translate the Dutch language to English and they always have their own 
Dutch words in their text. Understanding the requirements has been a big challenge for us in 
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many instances’. Similarly, RP7 (LION senior manager) noted: ‘There is a significant 
language barrier because we are not native English and the people in India are not native 
English speakers either, so sometimes you really have to search for what both parties mean 
when they say something’. 
Visiting the supplier’s offices in India (mentioned above as part of the structural 
dimension of social capital) was proved to be a very good way of bringing the employees 
together and gaining a better shared understanding of each other’s work practices. RP3 (LION 
Business manager) noted: ‘I had the privilege to travel to India, where I spent a week at their 
offices in Bangalore and Chennai. I went there first because I was very interested to see how 
work is carried out there, what it looks like. But second of all … to really meet the people that 
you are mailing with and that you are talking to. And to have a clear understanding of what 
we are doing. So I think that was a very, a very good thing to experience’.  
Our interviewees mentioned that the on-going communication (which we mentioned 
as part of the structural  dimension), lead to an exchange of ideas and integration of 
knowledge between the two parties, and was therefore very important for partners to gain 
competence in addressing issues, evaluating their alternatives, and improving the decision 
making process. In this manner, they had developed shared interpretations of how to 
collaborate. RP12 (Program manager from FDL) described this as a learning process which 
had led to significant improvements in the collaboration between the Indian team, the onshore 
team and LION: ‘In each project, we have learned lessons. … Every fortnight we have a 
working practices improvement meeting with LION. Maybe for their part they have some new 
things which could have been done in a better way. We are constantly looking for 
improvement opportunities’.  
As part of their initial difficulties in developing shared representations, interpretations 
and meaning systems, the partners had also not developed a clear shared vision in the early 
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stages of their collaboration. RP3 (LION Business manager) brought an example where LION 
realized that FDL did not have a good understanding of its aspirations and objectives: ‘We 
had a program integrating Postbank and LION Bank and at a certain time, while we thought 
that FDL knew why we were doing the project, what our goals where, what our timelines 
where, what we expected from them, we realized that this was not the case. While we thought 
we had communicated that in a very good way … we recognized that we needed to go and tell 
them what the program was about. … We did spend some time telling our story, answering 
questions, explaining why we were doing this program’. 
A number of interviewees commented on cultural issues between the on-site and the 
offshore team. Members of the Dutch site perceived the Indian team to be less proactive than 
LION would have liked them to be. A number of interviewees within LION commented on 
this issue. RP8 (LION service manager) noted that, to his frustration, although the Indian 
people had good technical competencies, they did not exploit them in order to come back with 
a new proposal for LION: ‘The Indian people are really on the working floor, so they can 
hear what the dynamic is... they could use that more to enlarge their own contracts. They are 
not very good at seeing opportunities and work these opportunities out for themselves to come 
back with a concrete proposal to us... There has never been an instance that they will say 
‘Hey, I think this is going wrong in your organization and we could offer this kind of service 
to you’...  They are only good in just doing what we ask them’.  
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Relational dimension1 
With regard to the relational dimension of social capital, respondents placed particular 
emphasis on the high level of trust between the partners. LION chose to work with FDL 
because they were confident that FDL was a technically competent organization. LION 
sought to work with a ‘low-risk’, rather than a ‘low-cost’ outsourcing partner and therefore 
the trustworthiness of the service provider was a priority during the supplier selection process. 
This indicates strong competence-based trust (see for example Newell & Swan, 2000) 
towards the vendor. In the words of RP10 (Account manager from FDL): ‘We made it very 
clear to LION that we are very trustworthy… the other suppliers were by far the cheapest in 
terms of cost savings, but we were by far the lowest risk because we had the skill set and we 
had a track record with LION… This is what convinced LION to work with us’.  
Moreover, participants in FDL clearly demonstrated a ‘partnership’ style of behavior 
when the needs of LION changed and the outsourcing arrangement needed to be revisited. 
LION, on the other hand, did not impose sanctions on FDL as a result of its underperformance 
during the integration project of Postbank and LION. The two firms worked together so that 
the requirements by LION were clearly communicated to FDL. This style of collaboration 
indicates high levels of companion trust (Newell & Swan, 2000), referring to the belief that 
the other partner will be open and honest, and not do harm to other members of the network. 
The partners’ behavior also points to their belief that the partner would be committed to 
deliver according to the requirements of the contract, which describes commitment trust 
(Newell & Swan, 2000).  
                                                          
1 With regard to the relational dimension of social capital, our respondents provided detailed accounts of trust 
and communication norms, but placed far less emphasis on the other parts of the relational dimension that are 
theoretically relevant for uncertainty reduction, namely ‘obligations and expectations’ or ‘identity and 
identification’. This is likely to be due to the prominent role of trust and communication norms in the 
relationships, but also due to the less tangible, more abstract nature of ‘obligations’ and ‘identity’. To do justice 
to our respondents’ perceptions, we do not include them in our analysis, both in the LION-FDL as well as the 
GIB-PV case study. 
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The high levels of trust can be traced back to the history of the collaboration. FDL was 
already doing a big part of the work that would be outsourced and had demonstrated a 
satisfactory competence in that work. A number of interviewees within LION commented that 
the prior good relationship between the two organizations, together with the satisfactory 
performance that FDL had been demonstrating constituted the major reasons why FDL won 
the contract. As RP3 (LION Business manager) commented: ‘LION selected FDL to offer 
services based on responses provided by FDL to an RFP for the outsourcing of the 
applications for savings and based on past experiences in working with FDL’. 
Face to face discussions during visits (described as part of the structural dimension of 
social capital) served to develop and maintain the trust between the two organizations. 
According to our LION respondents, the frequent visits from their supplier also constituted a 
good prove that FDL was a reliable organization.  
Furthermore, the partners had developed strong shared norms of communicating in an 
open and transparent manner. RP1 (LION director) gave an example where the two 
companies worked very transparently on their agreement and demonstrated a partnership-style 
of behavior. He explained that LION was facing a big pressure to reduce its costs and thus it 
was forced to cut down on systems development and subsequently on the hours they would 
need from FDL. He suggested that the two companies had a very honest discussion on the 
salaries of the Indian and Dutch employees (including the cost of lay-offs) and they changed 
the cost-structure of the contract accordingly: ‘Last year in 2008 until the middle of this year, 
like all banks, we had a huge cost reduction... one of the decisions we took was to seriously 
cut back on systems development, which of course reduced the number of hours we would 
need from FDL. They came back to us and said ‘The India part is not a problem. In India you 
simply say to your people going to the office that you do not need them anymore and that you 
will give them a call whenever you need them again. So there is an immediate ability to 
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reduce labour costs’... In the Netherlands the story is different because you first have to pay 
them to leave and then again if you would like to hire them again... so it is an expensive 
process. So they said ‘Isn’t it a good idea if you think that this cost pressure is a temporary 
thing to do the cost reduction in India? Of course the mix of employees based offshore versus 
the ones based onshore will be different, resulting in an increase on the average price per 
hour... but in total, the business case is better... That is under the condition, you as a 
customer, think this is a temporary thing’. We discussed this together and decided to keep the 
people in the Netherlands... And this is a very transparent way – and I think an example of 
partnership- where they said ‘lets openly discuss the choices we have’...’.  
 
THE GIB – PV CASE STUDY 
GIB is a major European bank with operations in more than 75 countries spread across 
Europe, USA and the Asia-Pacific. It has more than 80,000 employees and provides a range 
of investment and financial services to individuals, corporations and institutional clients. PV 
is a major IT company that provides a variety of products and services including software, 
BPO and infrastructure management services and it is one of the primary vendors of GIB.  PV 
is based in India, it employs about 55,000 people and is one of the country’s largest IT 
services exporters. Our investigation was focused on the ‘X-RAY’ project, which was on the 
development, support and maintenance of applications that were of relatively lower strategic 
importance for the bank.  
GIB and PV have a long standing business relationship. In particular, GIB created an 
organization called GIB Software in 1999, which was an offshore captive. This captive had 
been taken over by PV in 2004, and a number of the captive employees became PV 
employees. Some of the interpersonal relationships between the employees of the two 
organizations had therefore been long-lasting and strong.   
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Uncertainty around the GIB contract 
Environmental Uncertainty 
GIB interviewees emphasized that environmental uncertainty was a major concern for all 
firms operating in the financial sector. As an example, RP14 (GIB director of risk) mentioned 
that: ‘the financial industry is probably the most fast-pacing industry and we have to be 
dynamic as an organization, we have to keep up with the changes’. Changes in the market, 
customers’ preferences and needs as well as technology shifts are some of the primary 
challenges that financial firms have to cope with constantly. Furthermore, the bank was 
particularly sensitive to regulatory requirements, and thus in the contract there were several 
contractual clauses that requested the supplier to adhere to any regulatory changes. As an 
example, the service levels of the project needed to be amended from time to time in the light 
of any changing regulatory practices or any new industry wide procedures. The bank created 
the ‘global sourcing division’ which was working in conjunction with the legal department in 
order to make sure that any demand revisions were within the terms of the contract. Our 
interviewees did not mention facing issues with regards to the availability of suppliers. 
Internal uncertainty 
The year 2005 constituted a milestone in GIB’s approach to IT outsourcing because the 
company decided to enhance its governance processes and make them more rigid. By that 
time, the firm had recognized that having a strong governance mechanism in operation was of 
critical importance for keeping a tight control of its processes and realizing the benefits of IT 
outsourcing. On this basis, GIB started to work extensively on its IT outsourcing governance 
mechanisms and processes in 2005. By 2007, the firm managed to establish a strong IT 
outsourcing governance apparatus that has only been fine-tuned since then. In this sense, the 
level of professionalization within the IT department of GIB has been particularly strong after 
2007.  
 30 
 
GIB had a very integrated approach to contract monitoring and was trying to make 
sure that this function was taking place on a cross division basis. Furthermore, GIB was very 
effective in setting down initial requirements, estimating what processes could be influenced 
through IT outsourcing and how. On this basis, internal uncertainty in GIB appeared to be 
pretty low.  
Similar to the LION-FDL case, GIB also had no particular difficulties in measuring 
the performance of the vendor, and interviewees did not mention any significant 
disagreements with the vendor related to performance achieved. While PV did not always 
fully adhere to the SLAs, the end users were overall satisfied with service delivery.  RP24 
(PV Global account manager) further illustrated the strong governance in place between GIB 
and PV by emphasizing on the rigorous processes they follow: ‘All these governance 
meetings are documented in terms of what is discussed, what is agreed and then we track 
certain things. We go back next week and say what did we decide?... What have we 
achieved?... Then we say that we have achieved this, we haven’t achieved this, why we 
haven’t achieved this and what else we need to do in order to achieve what was agree… 
There is a fairly rigorous process of governance’. 
Behavioral uncertainty 
Our respondents within GIB identified PV as a ‘reliable’ vendor in terms of capabilities as 
well as commitment. This made the vendor’s behavior predictable, and rendered the perceived 
chances of opportunistic behavior low. As an example, RP 14 noted (GIB director of risk) 
‘GIB maintained a long relationship with PV... We know PV very well… the people, the 
management…. We knew that support and maintenance of applications was something that 
they are good at’. While there had been some turbulent times in the relationship of the two 
organizations, the two firms had established numerous outsourcing projects and PV was 
recognized as a strategic vendor to GIB. This long history of co-operation appeared to be an 
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important factor in decreasing behavioral uncertainty, and thereby limiting the possibility for 
vendor opportunism. Our interviewees mentioned that there were interpersonal relationships 
between the two organizations that lasted over 20 years.  
Furthermore, PV appeared to be very highly interested in keeping GIB satisfied, not 
least because it was its number one customer. RP25 (PV X-RAY Global transformation 
manager) illustrated the significance of GIB as a customer to PV: ‘We are dependent on the 
business and their support for so much of our work because that's the basis of our revenues.  
It's the basis for our, you know, promoting to other customers, also in terms of learning and 
so on’.   
 
Social capital  
Structural dimension 
The two organizations had been doing business with each other for a long time. As already 
been mentioned, GIB’s captive operation was taken over by PV in 2004 and a lot of captive 
employees became PV employees.  Some of the interpersonal relationships between GIB and 
PV had developed over the previous 20 years. On this basis, the two firms maintained a spirit 
of relative closeness. PV was considered to be one of the most important vendors of GIB. PV 
had undertaken many projects within GIB and the contracts between the two organizations 
were often being renewed.  
Furthermore, the two organizations had very clear patterns of connections and 
communication lines which were documented. Organizational members maintained frequent 
communication, and according to our interviewees, they felt quite close to their counterparts. 
On-going communications was seen as important in clearing out the objectives of the 
arrangement, as well as the obligations and expectations of each party. Furthermore, in 
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situations that required significant attention, members of GIB would fly over to India and 
vice-versa, in order to ensure that the arrangement progressed in line with the objectives.  
Cognitive dimension 
Because the two organizations had been collaborating for many years and some PV 
employees had been part of the former GIB offshore captive, cognitive social capital between 
the two organizations was highly developed. RP24 (PV Global account manager) noted that 
PV had a very good understanding of GIB’s systems, and according to him this was a very 
important reason why PV won the contract over its competitors and also a significant factor 
for the effective development of the venture. In his words ‘We have a very long relationship 
with them. We knew our understanding was much better than some of our competitors. We 
knew a lot of these applications… we had actually created some of these applications. There 
was a good understanding of the technology and the applications…. These were important 
reasons why [PV] were chosen and we were capable to perform well’.  
The shared understanding of the client’s technology was also important when SLA 
definitions were vague. The SLA created the risk that it did not safe-guard all of the 
customer’s interests. Some areas were easy to measure (e.g. downtime of a system), yet some 
areas were more vague (e.g. quality of code).  Regarding the interpretation of the performance 
of the vendor, it could be secondary whether an SLA had been met. It was the user’s 
expectations that needed to be fulfilled. On this basis, if an SLA had been met, however the 
users were not satisfied with the service, the end result was dissatisfaction with the supplier. 
Conversely, if users were satisfied with the service, even if an SLA had not been met, there 
would be no dissatisfaction with the supplier. Through their good understanding of the client 
firm’s system, PV was better able to fulfil user requirements regardless of the SLA 
specifications. 
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The two organizations had also been working regularly towards the alignment of their 
objectives and visions. Strong governance processes were there to support the exchange of 
views, ideas and align the visions between the two organizations. On this issue, RP23 (PV 
Head of integrated services delivery) noted: ‘Alignment of visions… This is what we do in our 
quarterly steering committee meetings. This consists of two parts. In the first part, we discuss 
how we have done in the past. In the second part we discuss what our vision of our account 
is… At the same time, GIB is sharing with us at which direction they are moving and what is 
expected from us. We constantly align our objectives and goals to make sure that both are 
working towards achieving those objectives’.  
According to our respondents, there were some on-going cultural issues between PV 
and GIB, but it appeared that these remained at a reasonable level. RP21 (GIB X-RAY 
product manager) illustrated that in a global business environment, cultural differences were 
always going to be present, but organizations needed to be flexible and accommodating: 
‘Cultural issues should not be a big problem... but you have to realize, you have to 
understand that there is a difference in the culture. As long as you understand that, then I do 
not see that as a big problem…. In that global business environment you should be able to be 
working with people with different cultures anyway… you should be accommodating’.  
As in the LION-FDL case, however, our GIB respondents observed some cultural 
obstacles. They mentioned that while PV was capable of delivering according to the expected 
standards, they did not demonstrate a proactive attitude. In the words of RP16 (GIB 
Investment Banking IT Sourcing and Vendor Management of IT portfolio): ‘We still have a 
cultural issue…. Indian culture is pretty much made of ‘yes… yes…’ rather than ‘why’…. The 
proactive thinking of Indian developers is not comparable at all with some of the vendors in 
Russia. In Russia they are thinking of ‘how can I make that better, what is a better 
alternative’ etc… Regarding PV however (and other Indian vendors of ours) if you tell them 
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A, B and C… they will do A, B, C. They may do A, B, D because they did not get it right. If 
you are wrong in asking for A, B, C but A, B, E… they will never offer you A, B, E … even if 
they know that A, B, C is not the best solution’. He acknowledged, however, that GIB did 
currently not pay adequately enough to obtain the best PV talent. He mentioned that Indian 
vendors, including PV, would try to allocate their best talent to the most attractive projects at 
the most attractive rates.  
Relational dimension 
In this case study, respondents focussed again on trust and communication norms, far more 
than on other parts of the relational dimension. The two organizations had built significant 
amount of trust over the years. RP25 (PV X-RAY Global transformation manager) elaborated 
on the way that PV tried to demonstrate its willingness to co-operate with GIB and how a 
climate of trust had been created: ‘We wanted to show them that we would go to any extent to 
ensure that their expectations from us would be met... We put a lot of effort into 
understanding what the business wanted from GIB IT and in effect what GIB IT wanted from 
us’. In addition to organizational trust, interpersonal trust at the individual level was also very 
important in the view of our respondents. RP24 (PV Global account manager) emphasized: 
‘After all, people work with people... There is a lot of good in the organizations working 
together for a long time... There is a feeling of comfort.’. 
Trust had also been established because people within the two organizations felt that 
their counterparts were being supportive. As an example, RP26 (PV X-RAY European 
program manager) illustrated his own experience: ‘On a personal note, speaking with some of 
the GIB managers they have said to me ‘If you ever need any help, even though we are 
expecting not to be involved, come over and shout if there is problem. It might be something 
that we are aware of or something that we have a point of view on’… So that is very good for 
the venture… that means that we are building the relationship with the GIB management…. 
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Because you need to be able to say ‘I need your help in this’… or ‘I do not know, I really do 
not know the answer to that and thus I need your support’… If I am comfortable to be able to 
go over and do that, then they will feel the same kind of trust…’.  
In addition to trusting relationships at the project level, the two organizations had 
strong relationships at the executive level. According to our interviewees, these relationships 
between senior managers also contributed to the maintenance of a good working spirit 
between the two organizations.  
As in the LION-FDL case, the norms of communication between the organizations 
were characterized by openness and transparency. Our interviewees explained they could be 
open and honest with their counterparts. The words of RP13 (GIB Vendor 
decisions/Relationship management) are very revealing, in that the vendor was open in the 
confrontation of problematic situations: ‘They have acknowledged that they had a fault in 
some cases, they have revealed things to us that we did not know they were wrong, but that 
was good…. I was quite amazed actually at some of the things they told us voluntarily… but I 
like it’. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The role of social capital in uncertainty reduction 
Our results imply that social capital played an important role in reducing uncertainty and 
thereby mitigating opportunistic behavior in the outsourcing partnerships. The precise 
linkages are presented in Figure 1. 
 
- Insert Figure 1 about here - 
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The LION-FDL as well as the GIB-PV outsourcing projects faced high levels of 
environmental uncertainty. In LION, the volume of services needed from the service provider 
within the savings and loans area had been changing with the unpredictable fluctuations of the 
financial markets, and had declined as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Respondents at 
GIB, in turn, saw major challenges in the changes of the market, customers’ preferences, and 
technology. The service providers in both case studies under investigation could have 
exploited these uncertain circumstances and demanded that the client firms fulfilled their 
commitments according to the initial contract, whether the clients made actual use of the 
service or not. In other words, environmental uncertainty could have encouraged 
opportunistic behavior. However, the social capital between the client and the vendor 
organizations reduced the levels of internal and behavioral uncertainty (as discussed later on) 
and therefore mitigated the possibility for such a scenario.   
Internal uncertainty was low in the GIB-PV case but high in the LION-FLD case. GIB 
and their vendor had defined precise formal governance mechanisms. They were also 
effective in defining initial requirements and facilitating and monitoring the contract. The low 
levels of internal uncertainty within GIB limited the potential for PV to behave 
opportunistically. LION, in contrast, had difficulty in translating its business needs to systems 
requirements and identifying the scope of projects. The information flow within LION was 
also not effective, and the communication lines between different organizational divisions 
were blurred. This internal uncertainty within LION could have been exploited by FDL, 
yielding opportunistic behavior. However, instead of this, the two organizations worked 
further on the development of their cognitive social capital (shared representations and vision) 
and aligned their goals, objectives and supporting processes. It therefore appears that building 
social capital, and in this instance the cultivation of their cognitive social capital, mitigated 
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the levels of internal uncertainty between the two organizations (see link between cognitive 
dimension and internal uncertainty in Figure 1).  
At the beginning of their co-operation, LION and FDL had different visions and their 
expectations had not been communicated properly. Their mutual understanding regarding the 
goals of their arrangements was limited, and therefore the basis for an effective co-operation 
was constrained. During the process of building structural social capital in terms of 
appropriate information sharing processes and points of communication, the two 
organizations came closer and started to understand each other better. Through this, the 
cognitive dimension of social capital was built (see link between structural dimension and 
cognitive dimension in Figure 1), and internal uncertainty was decreased (see link between 
cognitive dimension and internal uncertainty in Figure 1). This reduction in internal 
uncertainty provided security to FDL with regards to the engagement of opportunistic 
behavior on behalf of the vendor.   
Regarding the GIB and PV case, cognitive social capital in terms of GIB’s and PV’s 
shared understanding of user requirements served as a complement to formal governance 
mechanisms when these did not fully represent the user requirements, thus decreasing internal 
uncertainty (see link between cognitive dimension and internal uncertainty in Figure 1). 
Based on their shared understanding, GIB did not impose any penalties even when the vendor 
did not adhere to the SLAs, as long as the satisfaction of users was significant. Conversely, 
when the vendor did adhere to the SLAs, but the satisfaction of users was low, PV 
acknowledged that it had to work with GIB and find ways and processes to improve the users’ 
satisfaction. Cognitive capital had in this case been built through the close and frequent 
interactions over the long time of the collaboration, which had allowed the vendor to gain a 
thorough understanding of GIB’s systems and develop shared objective. In this sense, the 
structural dimension of social capital was again the basis for developing the cognitive 
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dimension of social capital (see link between structural dimension and cognitive dimension in 
Figure 1).  
In addressing internal uncertainty, LION and FDL also developed shared 
communication norms as they worked out their information sharing in an open and honest 
way (relational dimension of social capital). This provided them with better knowledge of the 
operations of each other, the business requirements of LION and the calculation model by 
FDL, demonstrating a link between the relational and cognitive dimension of social capital 
(see Figure 1). Similarly, in the GIB case the partners’ strong relational capital, in particular 
their communication norms of openness and transparency, had helped them to develop their 
shared understanding of GIBs’ systems (see link between relational dimension and cognitive 
dimension in Figure 1). According to our respondents, this knowledge of each other’s 
operations (cognitive dimension) was significant for reducing internal uncertainty, because it 
served to establish the principles behind service delivery in a manner that was going to be 
beneficial for both sides (see link between cognitive dimension and internal uncertainty in 
Figure 1).  
In both cases, frequent on-going communication via telephone conferences and mutual 
visits by managers (structural dimension) allowed employees within the client and vendor 
firms to get to know the people they had been talking to and understand more about the 
business practices and challenges of both organizations (cognitive dimension). Our 
respondents used phrases such as ‘people calling each other’, ‘people explaining to each 
other’, ‘people flying to India when needed’ in order to emphasize the importance of 
communication processes and their role in generating cognitive social capital (see link 
between structural dimension and cognitive dimension in Figure 1).  
In the LION-FDL case, a number of our respondents further mentioned the role of a 
boundary spanner, which can be regarded as part of the structural dimension of social capital, 
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in the reduction of behavioral and internal uncertainty between the two organizations. A 
number of respondents acknowledged that his role was critical in bringing the two 
organizations together and bridging the gaps in the understanding of each other’s objectives, 
expectations and business processes, thus creating cognitive social capital (see link between 
structural dimension and cognitive dimension in Figure 1). Thereby, this boundary spanner 
was able to ensure effective service delivery, thus reducing internal uncertainty (see link 
between cognitive dimension and internal uncertainty in Figure 1).  
In both case studies, the behavioral uncertainty between the two outsourcing partners 
appeared to be relatively low. The relational dimension of social capital that existed between 
the client and vendor organizations was illustrated to be particularly significant for behavioral 
uncertainty. In both cases, a number of our respondents indicated the importance of strong 
informal relationships (relational dimension) for creating a sense of reliability between the 
outsourcing partners. Informal communications and working practices created a bond 
between the two organizations and a climate of collaboration that reduced behavioral 
uncertainty (see link between relational dimension and behavioral uncertainty in Figure 1) and 
therefore the expectation of opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, the history of co-operation 
between client and vendor firms prior to signing the outsourcing contract had created trust and 
therefore reduced the expectation of opportunistic behavior on behalf of the vendor, which 
can be described as ‘business familiarity’ in the sense of Gefen et al. (2008). The clients were 
co-operating efficiently with the vendors, and the vendors had proved their trustworthiness by 
demonstrating a reliable and professional attitude. Frequent interactions and visits (structural 
dimension) had helped to develop such trusting relationships as well as shared communication 
norms (relational dimension) between the partners (see link between structural dimension and 
relational dimension in Figure 1). 
 40 
 
In sum, the creation of social capital between the client and supplier organizations 
contributed significantly to the reduction of internal uncertainty (LION case) and behavioral 
uncertainty (both cases) in the outsourcing arrangement, and thereby decreased the likelihood 
of opportunistic behavior on behalf of the vendors. We were able to designate the differential 
influence of the three social capital dimensions on specific types of uncertainty. We found a 
strong association between the cognitive dimension with internal uncertainty, and of the 
relational dimension with behavioral uncertainty. The structural dimension (in our case 
frequent communication and visits), played a role as the basis for developing cognitive and 
relational social capital.  
Social capital did not affect environmental uncertainty directly, which is in line with 
our expectations. However, it has to be noted that social capital influenced the degree to 
which environmental uncertainty could entail opportunistic behavior. In our study, 
environmental uncertainty did not instigate opportunistic behavior, and this was because 
social capital had reduced internal and behavioral uncertainty to a level where vendor and 
supplier did not behave opportunistically, despite the uncertain environmental conditions. 
 
Theoretical contributions 
Our results reinforce the view that the theory of transaction costs alone is limited to fully 
account for the complex phenomenon of outsourcing, as suggested by Lacity et al. (2011). By 
demonstrating the important role of social capital for reducing uncertainty and thereby 
opportunistic behavior, we substantiate the argument that the neglect of the social context 
within which transactions take place significantly constrains explanations of how 
opportunistic behavior is elicited and how it can potentially be managed.  
An analysis that takes a TCE perspective alone focuses on the significance of complex 
contracts or contracts with a large number of detailed clauses (Reurer & Arino, 2007), as tools 
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that safeguard against opportunistic behavior. The threat of the imposition of penalties and 
other accountabilities created as a result of legal obligations are regarded as the primary 
deterrents of opportunistic behavior. In this frame, TCE takes a rather coercive perspective on 
the mitigation of opportunistic behavior. In other words, this TCE approach assumes that 
vendors behave in a desirable way for the outsourcing venture not because they perceive 
attractive opportunities for collaboration, partnership and expansion, but because they are 
forced to do so.   
Our case findings, however, reveal that the vendors of the arrangements under 
investigation had numerous opportunities (resulting from environmental uncertainty and/or 
internal uncertainty) to behave opportunistically, but did not do so. While TCE theory was 
useful in the identification of situations where the vendors could have behaved 
opportunistically, we found that this theory could not adequately explain why this did not 
actually happen. Accordingly, our analysis demonstrates that a combination of TCE with the 
theory of social capital unveils a range of avenues of how opportunistic behavior can be 
reduced deliberately. In this frame, we found that the dimensions of social capital, including 
frequent and close interactions, a shared understanding and vision, as well as trust and strong 
communication norms, reduced internal and behavioral uncertainty and therefore mitigated 
the risk for opportunistic behavior.  
 Our research also provides contributions to social capital theory. Researchers  have 
regarded social capital as a resource that leads to several benefits (e.g. Coleman, 1988, Inkpen 
& Tsang, 2005; Payne et al., 2011; Reagans & Evily, 2003), but they have not paid attention 
to its role in reducing internal and behavioral uncertainty and opportunistic behavior. To some 
extent, these effects resonate with the ‘solidarity’ benefits mentioned by Adler and Kwon 
(2002), who explain that strong social norms and beliefs (as part of the relational dimension) 
lead to solidarity within a social network, because they encourage members to comply with a 
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group’s rules, which in turn reduces the need for formal controls (2002: 29), which  can be 
explained in terms of uncertainty reduction. It is clear that for network members, solidarity 
creates a degree of certainty about other network members’ behavior. This may be most 
apparent and most important in settings of high environmental and internal uncertainty, such 
as ours. In such settings, strong social ties can create solidarity which reduces uncertainties 
about other network members’ behaviors. This, in turn, will diminish the need for formal, 
contractual control of these behaviors. More specifically, our findings demonstrate that a 
shared vision (cognitive dimension), trust, and shared communication norms (relational 
dimension) motivated members of both firms to spend effort in achieving shared goals, to act 
in a reliable and trustworthy manner, and to expect the other partner to do the same, even in 
the absence of formal controls. In this sense, it created solidarity between the partners, which 
yielded some certainty that other members of the arrangements would not act in an 
opportunistic manner. By combining TCE and social capital theory, we were however able to 
go beyond the notion of solidarity and its role in uncertainty reduction. We were able to 
explain in detail how each of the three dimensions of social capital affected different types of 
uncertainty and thereby mitigated the risk of opportunistic behavior in outsourcing 
relationships. 
 
Practical implications 
Our findings have important practical implications. According to our results, investment in 
mechanisms of social capital can contribute significantly to the reduction of uncertainty 
between the outsourcing partners and therefore mitigate the possibility for opportunistic 
behavior. Visits of managers from the client to the supplier, and vice versa, have been found 
to have a particularly significant impact on the creation of cognitive and relational social 
capital. These visits facilitate a better understanding between people and enable them to better 
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understand the workings and processes between both organizations. In this way, managers 
gain important knowledge on how they can improve their processes and work together in a 
way that will satisfy the expectations of both sides.  
While increasing the social interactions among managers is important, we suggest that 
building social capital requires more than establishing social ties. In our view, it requires 
nurturing the motivation to sustain and cultivate the relationship. We found the role of 
boundary spanners to be particularly significant in this direction. Key individuals who have a 
very good understanding of the processes and business on both sides can create a sense of 
reliability for the customer, and also facilitate the relationship between the two organizations. 
Vendor organizations should therefore pay particular consideration to the role of boundary 
spanners.  
 
Limitations and further research 
The main limitation of this study is that it focused on two case studies and has limited power 
to provide statistically generalizable results (Yin, 2009). The primary objective of this 
research, however, was to generate an in-depth assessment of the social context of the 
outsourcing transactions under investigation and, in this frame, conduct a thorough 
examination of a vendor’s opportunistic behavior and the role of uncertainty. We therefore 
decided to use an in-depth qualitative case study approach in order to yield more profound 
and richer insights into the phenomenon. Future research could use the elements of our model 
- social capital dimensions, types of uncertainty, and opportunistic behavior – as variables for 
a quantitative survey to test the model and assess the generalizability of our findings across a 
broad range of companies.  
To gain a broader view, it is also necessary to conduct further qualitative, in-depth 
research on the role of social capital for opportunistic behavior in other settings. To 
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consolidate our model, it would be useful to investigate contrasting cases where social capital 
is weak, for example through infrequent communication or significant relational conflicts.  
Another limitation of our research is that our examination focused on opportunistic 
behavior on behalf of the vendor. Opportunistic behavior on behalf of the client, in turn, is a 
relatively under-researched area. It would therefore be significant for future research to 
provide a more in-depth consideration of the factors that lead to the engagement of 
opportunistic behavior on behalf of the client, as well as directions for their deterrence. 
In our study, we focused on opportunistic behavior in conjunction with the existence 
of uncertainty in the outsourcing venture. Future research could explore the role of social 
capital mechanisms in conjunction with other factors that influence opportunistic behavior 
from a TCE point of view, such as transaction frequency, asset specificity and ‘small numbers 
of suppliers’. Researchers could address the impact of social capital on opportunistic behavior 
in the context of different types of relationship specific investments, i.e. human, temporal, 
dedicated, site, procedural or physical investments (see Williamson, 1985) and address their 
potential to mitigate opportunistic behavior. Social capital mechanisms may also be relevant 
when there is a ‘small number’ of suppliers in the market, and therefore the relationship 
aspects of the arrangement become more prominent. Last but not least, future research could 
explore the role of social capital in the context of multi-sourcing arrangements, especially in 
co-ordinating the activity and mitigating the potential for opportunistic behavior across a set 
of vendors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have made a first important step in combining the theories of TCE and social 
capital to provide a more detailed view of mechanisms by which opportunistic behavior in 
outsourcing relationships can be prevented. Whilst TCE theory highlights the role of asset 
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specificity and uncertainty for opportunistic actions, social capital theory sheds light on how, 
very specifically, the structural, cognitive, and relational dimension of social capital can 
mitigate the impact of different types of uncertainty.  
Our qualitative methodology allowed us to provide rich descriptions of the levels of 
uncertainty surrounding the transaction and the prevailing social capital mechanisms between 
the outsourcing partners. We further validate that the social context within which transactions 
take place is crucial, and the occurrence of opportunistic behavior should be studied in 
conjunction with this context. While TCE takes a rather coercive perspective on the 
deterrence of opportunistic behavior, the theory of social capital reveals a range of more 
deliberate avenues in this respect. When social capital is strong, transaction partners are more 
likely to refrain from opportunistic behavior by their own volition. In our case, strong social 
capital motivated members of both firms to behave in a reliable and trustworthy manner, even 
in the absence of formal controls. This mutual solidarity created a sense of certainty that other 
network members of the outsourcing arrangement would not behave in an opportunistic 
manner.   
Our research therefore suggests that the theory of transaction costs, while providing a 
useful frame for thought on sourcing decisions, is not adequate for accommodating 
opportunistic behavior in outsourcing transactions in a comprehensive manner. Instead, the 
theory of social capital should be used as a complement to the transaction costs theorization to 
facilitate stronger accounts on outsourcing considerations. 
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Figure 1. Social capital, uncertainty, and opportunistic behavior in the outsourcing partnership 
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Cognitive dimension 
- Shared representations, 
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systems of meaning  
- Shared vision and culture 
 
 
Relational dimension 
- Trust 
- Communication norms 
 
Social capital 
Internal 
- Definition and stability of 
service requirements  
- Level of professionalization  
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Behavioral 
- Predictability of behavior 
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Opportunistic 
behavior 
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Table 1. Research participants from LION and FDL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LION case study 
Research participants from 
LION 
Role 
RP1 Director 
RP2 Lawyer 
RP3 Business manager 
RP4 Demand manager 
RP5 Contract manger 
RP6 Contract manager 
RP7 Senior manager 
RP8 Service manager 
Research participants from 
FDL 
Role 
RP9 Contract manager 
RP10 Account manager 
RP11 Consultant 
RP12 Program manager 
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Table 2. Research participants from GIB and PV 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research participants 
from PV 
Role 
RP23 Head of integrated 
services delivery 
RP24 Global account manager 
RP25 (five conversations) X-RAY Global 
transformation manager 
RP26 X-RAY European program 
manager 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
GIB case study 
Research participants 
from GIB 
Role 
RP13 Vendor 
decisions/Relationship 
management 
RP14 (seven 
conversations) 
Director of risk 
RP15 (two conversations) Lawyer 
RP16 Investment Banking IT 
Sourcing and Vendor 
Management of IT 
portfolio 
RP17 Lawyer 
RP18 Consultant 
RP19 Global technology 
outsourcing vendor 
management 
RP20 Senior manager in 
operations 
RP21 X-RAY product manager 
RP22 Client solutions partner 
